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The concern with the power of judgment arises in Hannah Arendt‘s 
work in response to critical events in modernity in which, as a result of the 
impotence of familiar standards and categories to provide answers and 
orientation, this power has become undone.
1
 Arendt already broaches the 
crisis of understanding and judgment in 1953, that is, two years after the 
publication of her work on totalitarianism, in an essay entitled 
Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding) where she 
states that ―the rise of totalitarian governments is the central event of our 
world.‖ However, it is only as a result of her reading (or rather re-reading) 
of Kant‘s Critique of the Power of Judgment in 1957 that Arendt explicitly 
begins to develop a political concept of judgment that would be up to the 
challenge of events that defy both common sense and cognitive 
understanding.
2
 In a letter from August 29, 1957, to Karl Jaspers she 
writes:  
At the moment I‘m reading the Kritik der Urteilskraft with 
increasing fascination. There, and not in the Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft, is where Kant‘s real political philosophy is hidden. His 
praise for ―common sense,‖ which is so often scorned; the 
phenomenon of taste taken seriously as the basic phenomenon of 
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judgment . . . ; the ―expanded mode of thought‖ that is part and 
parcel of judgment, so that one can think from someone else‘s point 
of view. The demand for communicativeness. . . . I‘ve always loved 
this book most of Kant‘s critiques, but it has never before spoken to 
me as powerfully as it does now that I have read your Kant chapter.
3
 
It is only at this time that her reflections on judgment and the faculty of 
judgment become informed by and critically measure themselves up to 
Kant‘s conception of a distinct faculty associated with judgment and that 
she takes issue with the elements that constitute a judgment of taste 
distinct from a cognitive judgment. A case in point is Arendt‘s 
uncompleted manuscript of Introduction into Politics. Sometime between 
1957 and 1958, she writes that in the political arena ―we cannot function at 
all without judging in general [Urteilen überhaupt], because political 
thought is essentially based in the power of judgment [Urteilskraft].‖4  
These posthumously published fragments of the Introduction do not 
further elaborate on this assertion that political thought is ―essentially 
based in the power of judgment,‖ but the observations set forth there about 
this power—made in explicit reference to Kant—already show to what 
extent Arendt‘s attempt to link political thought to the capacity of 
judgment presumes an ongoing debate with Kant‘s Critique of Judgment. 
From these concerns in the mid-fifties to the projected third and 
concluding part on judgment of her work The Life of the Mind, of which, 
unfortunately, she had no time to write any more, Arendt‘s reflections on 
the political are consistently involved in seeking to make Kant‘s 
understanding of judgment in his last critical work fruitful for a theory of 
politics. But I hold that it is never Arendt‘s intention to provide a correct 
reading of Kant‘s third Critique. From the start she has a certain 
conception of political judgment, and her aim is to find elements to 
develop this concept philosophically in the works of the philosopher 
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whom she considers the sole exception in a tradition of political 
philosophy that follows Plato‘s condemnation of the public realm and 
politics. From early on Arendt scholars have addressed her concern with 
judgment and have critically taken issue with her reading of the Critique 
of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment as containing essentially a political 
philosophy, which, as Arendt herself acknowledges, Kant never explicitly 
developed.
5
 They have also argued regularly over the thesis that Arendt‘s 
understanding of judgment evolves from an earlier period in which 
judgment is more intimately associated with action, to the later position in 
The Life of the Mind where it is supposedly framed by the contemplative 
nature of the mind.
6
 Finally, more often than not these two types of 
commentators have flatly questioned her reading of Kant. I do not intend 
to challenge these interpretations in any direct fashion; my aim is much 
more modest. By focusing in a somewhat more technical way than is 
generally the case in Arendt scholarship, on one Kantian distinction in 
particular—the difference between determinant and aesthetic reflective 
judgment—I wish to explore how Arendt‘s suggestion, however 
problematic, that the aesthetic judgment alone is a genuine judgment, and 
an instance of the power of judgment, paves the way for a political 
conception of judgment. This conception is needed in order to set what she 
calls the Erscheinungsraum constitutive of the political sphere radically 
apart from political and public spaces characterized by violence and in 
order to be able to discriminate within this space of appearances between 
those that are right or wrong.  
Let me return to Arendt‘s remarks on judgment in the Introduction into 
Politics. She writes: 
In our use of language [that is, in German], the word ―judgment‖ 
has two meanings that certainly ought to be differentiated but that 
always get confused whenever we speak. First of all, judgment 
means organizing and subsuming the individual and particular 
under the general and universal, that is, the orderly assessment [das 
regelnde Messen mit Massstäben] by applying standards to them, 
with respect to which the concrete has to identify itself, and which 
permit deciding about it. Behind all such judgments there is a 
prejudgment, a prejudice, 
 
 
 5. See, e.g., Robert J. Dostal, Judging Human Action: Arendt’s Appropriation of Kant, 37 REV. 
OF METAPHYSICS 725–55 (1984). 
 6. See, e.g., Ronald Beiner, Interpretive Essay of HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT‘S 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 89–156 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1982) [hereinafter ARENDT, LECTURES]. 











since the standard against which particulars are to be held, once it is 
adopted, is not put in question any more.
7
 In spite of what Arendt says 
here about the standard in this first meaning of judgment, which, no doubt, 
refers to Kant‘s determined concepts, one can easily recognize that she is 
speaking of ―determined judgment.‖ Apart from the fact that in such 
judgments the particular is notoriously subsumed under something that is 
already known in advance of the act of judging, prioritizing the known 
over decision, the categorizing and ordering implied in such a judgment 
have, as Arendt suggests, ―more to do with thinking as deductive 
[schlussfolgernden] reasoning than with thinking as an act of judgment.‖8 
Furthermore, to conflate determining judgment with the power of 
judgment 
tacitly assume[s] that human beings can be expected to render 
judgments only if they possess standards, that the faculty of 
judgment is thus nothing more than the ability to assign individual 
cases to their correct and proper places within the general principles 




But, according to Arendt, there is a second meaning of the word, and 
the thing, ―judgment.‖ She writes:  
Judgment can, however, mean something totally different, and 
indeed it always does when we are confronted with something 
which we have never seen before and for which there are no 
standards at our disposal. This judgment that knows no standards 
[das massstablos ist] can appeal to nothing but the evidence of what 
is being judged, and its sole prerequisite is the faculty of judgment, 
which has far more to do with man‘s ability to make distinctions 
than with his ability to organize and subsume.
10
  
Again, in spite of what is said about the power of judgment as having 
more to do with the ability to make distinctions than with subsumption—a 
contention that is, undoubtedly, tributary to Kant‘s translation of ―facultas 
dijudicandi‖ as ―Urteilskraft‖ but that also shows, as we will later see, that 
Arendt‘s conception of judgment, as well as her reading of Kant on this 
matter, is strongly guided by the Aristotelian concept of phronesis. There 
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is no difficulty in recognizing Kant‘s notion of reflective judgment in her 
description of the second meaning of judgment, to which she refers as 
massstabloses Urteilen (judgment without standards), especially since she 
explicitly mentions Kant‘s concept of the judgment of taste. In any case, 
this kind of judgment without standards is the only one that merits the 
name judgment, since it alone is called forth when there is something to be 
judged or decided about in the strict sense of the word. As we will see 
later, there is more to this characterization of the reflective judgment as 
one without standards; it also anticipates the subject matter that calls for 
reflective judgment itself. Arendt refers to such a judgment as ―original 
judgment,‖ in German, ursprüngliches Urteilen, which I would rather 
translate here as ―authentic‖ or ―genuine judgment.‖11 
In the ―Postscriptum‖ to the first part of The Life of the Mind, entitled 
Thinking, Arendt contends that ―[n]ot till Kant‘s Critique of Judgment did 
[the faculty of judgment] become a major topic of a major thinker.‖12 In 
her own translation into German of the essay The Crisis of Culture, she 
goes so far as to suggest that Kant is the first discoverer of the power of 
judgment. Indeed, she writes that Kant ―discovered this phenomenon in all 
its grandeur precisely when he was examining the phenomenon of taste 
and hence the only kind of judgments . . . .‖13 This point is stressed again 
in the Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy where Arendt submits that 
―behind taste, a favorite topic of the whole eighteenth century, Kant had 
discovered an entirely new human faculty, namely, judgment . . . .‖14 It is 
true, of course, that judgment as a faculty has not received as much 
attention in the tradition as other faculties, such as thinking, reason, or the 
will, and that it is Kant who provided the most specific determination of 
this power of the mind. Arendt‘s statements are nonetheless a bit startling 
if one thinks of Aristotle, of the venerable juridical and rhetorical concepts 
of iudicium, and of the reflections on taste from Baltasar Gracian (who 
coined the word ―taste‖), through Earl of Shaftesbury and Alexander 
Gottfried Baumgarten, to Georg Friedrich Meier. In any case, as the 
citation from the Lectures demonstrates, Arendt‘s point is that it is ―behind 
taste‖ that Kant discovered this ―entirely new faculty,‖ which is not to be 
confounded with the aesthetic judgment itself but is nonetheless reflective 
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by nature and therefore also essentially distinct from logical, syllogistic, or 
determinate judgment. Indeed, in the ―Postscriptum,‖ Arendt makes it 
clear right away that what she understands by judgment as a distinct 
capacity of the mind ―[has] nothing in common with logical operations—
as when we say: All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, hence Socrates is 
mortal.‖15 It has nothing to do with the capacity of drawing logical 
conclusions. Logicality, she says in Understanding and Politics, is the 
―substitute‖ one is likely to accept ―wherever common sense, the political 
sense par excellence, fails us in our need for understanding . . . .‖16 In fact, 
by recalling Kant‘s reference in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point 
of View to ―logical Eigensinn,‖ that is, logical private sense (if not 
pigheadedness), Arendt holds that even though such Eigensinn would cut 
off all logical cognition from experience, the implication is that logical, or 
determinant, judgment can in principle ―function without 
communication . . . .‖17 Yet, this also implies, therefore, that for her 
determinant judgment is not a judgment as she understands it. As we learn 
from Between Past and Future, if a logical judgment (but a moral 
judgment, as well) is not a judgment to begin with, it is because in these 
judgments there is nothing to judge, to decide, to krinein, and thus—
strictly speaking—they are not judgments at all. The capacity to judge, she 
repeatedly argues, is one ―for making distinctions.‖18 In her remarkable 
discussion in her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy of what causes a 
sense judgment such as the judgment of taste, that is, a judgment that is 
based on what has been considered one of the lower senses and whose 
judgments are entirely private and non-communicable, to become 
nonetheless the vehicle for the aesthetic reflective judgment that makes 
claims to universality and is eminently communicable, Arendt highlights 
the fact that the judgment by the private sense of taste is from the start 
discriminatory in an immediate fashion.
19
 Indeed, this instantaneous 
discrimination of the judgment of taste as a lower sense provides the 
model for the reflective judgment concerning the beautiful, which is 
discriminatory, as well. 
According to Arendt, Kant assumed that the question of how to 
discriminate between right and wrong, beautiful and ugly, true and untrue, 
does not exist for Truth and the Moral Law, since these are given in 
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advance, and particulars only need to be subsumed under them. By 
contrast, since Kant ―defined judgment as the faculty which always comes 
into play when we are confronted with particulars,‖ a decision has to be 
made ―about the relation between a particular instance and the 
general . . . .‖20 Speaking with political judgment in mind, which, besides 
judgments of taste, is the main example of a judgment in a rigorous sense, 
or, rather, is the instantiation of the power of judgment itself, Arendt 
writes that the faculty in question is ―[t]he faculty of judging particulars 
(as Kant discovered it) . . . .‖21 More precisely, ―[i]t is the faculty to judge 
particulars without subsuming them under those general rules which can 
be taught and learned until they grow into habits that can be replaced by 
other habits and rules.‖22 In short, only judgments that are reflective, rather 
than determinant, are judgments in the strict sense. It is this claim that I 
wish to investigate hereafter.  
On what basis can Arendt dismiss determinant judgment as a judgment 
to begin with? Is this simply an outrageous contention? Or are there 
developments, or statements, in the Critique of Judgment that could 
support Arendt‘s claim, at least up to a certain point? Consider, for 
example, Kant‘s observation in section thirty-five of the third Critique:  
The judgment of taste differs from logical judgment in that the latter 
subsumes a representation under concepts of the object, but the 
former does not subsume under a concept at all, for otherwise the 
necessary universal approval could be compelled by proofs. All the 
same, however, it is similar to the latter in that it professes a 
universality and necessity [which] is grounded only on the 
subjective formal condition of a judgment in general [eines Urteils 
überhaupt]. The subjective condition of all judgments is the faculty 
for judging itself, or the power of judgment.
23
 
Could Kant‘s contention that the reflective judgment meets the conditions 
of a judgment in general be construed in such a manner as to justify its 
characterization as being the only judgment worthy of this name?  
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―[T]he capacity to judge,‖ Arendt contends, ―is a specifically political 
activity . . . .‖24 Even though Kant never developed a political philosophy, 
Arendt holds that the outlines of such a philosophy, and hence of a theory 
of judgment, are to be found in the Critique of Judgment—more precisely, 
in what Kant develops about reflective judgment in distinction from 
determinant judgment in the parts devoted to the judgment upon the 
beautiful and, even more narrowly, in the parts devoted to the artwork (in 
distinction from the beauty of nature) and the genius of art. It needs to be 
pointed out that the privilege that Arendt accords to Kant‘s elaborations on 
the genius and the beautiful arts is justified to some extent by the fact that 
the problem of communicability and critical debate of judgments of taste 
is only explicitly broached in Kant‘s elaboration of the reflective aesthetic 
judgment concerning artificial beauty as opposed to the beauty of objects 
of nature. Yet, Arendt‘s reading of Kant‘s elaboration on judgment has 
encountered reservations of all kinds, and—though it is true that her 
strategy in reading Kant invites close critical scrutiny—in what follows I 
will largely, but by no means completely, abstract from such 
considerations. After all, which great thinker has not misconstrued some 
of his or her sources for developing a novel approach to some venerable 
problematic? 
In order to understand how Arendt can make the point that a logical 
judgment is not truly a judgment, let me take up the well-known but not 
necessarily well understood distinction between determinant and reflective 
judgments. Although the distinction in question is not exclusive to the 
Critique of Judgment—I refer, for example, to #81 of the Logic from 
1800, which is limited to the accomplishment of the teleological 
judgment—it is the the third Critique that commonly serves as the source 
for making the distinction. Its common phrasing is well known:  
If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the 
power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it . . . is 
determining. If, however, only the particular is given, for which the 




But, thus defined, this definition is not only formal; it also has something 
formulaic about it. Furthermore, because of the inverse logic of the 
definition process it suggests a facile—if not self-evident—and very 
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simple distinction, and more often than not it is in this form that one 
encounters it in the literature. Only by paying some attention to the notions 
of ―subsuming‖ the particular under the universal and of ―finding‖ (or, as 
Kant also says occasionally, of ―ascending [aufsteigen]‖ from the 
particular to the universal) and, especially, to what ―reflecting‖ amounts to 
in a reflective judgment does this distinction lose its deceptive simplicity. 
Indeed, reflection is not simply the opposite of determination. As Kant 
makes amply clear through his insistence on the fact that the power of 
judgment is only ―merely‖ reflecting when it is a question of finding the 
universal for a particular, determining judgment also involves some 
reflection. The question, then, is what reflection accomplishes in a 
―merely‖ reflective judgment and what the universal is that it finds, or to 
which it ascends, in distinction from what happens in a determining 
judgment. 
Since, for Arendt, only the reflective judgment—whether aesthetic or 
political—is the unadulterated expression of the power of judgment, let me 
first recall that, before offering the distinction between both kinds of 
judgment, Kant maintains that ―[t]he power of judgment in general is the 
faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal.‖26 
Now, Arendt also seems to make this point when she argues that there is 
judgment only where one confronts the particular without having in 
advance fixed concepts, standards, or rules to subsumptively account for 
it. When faced with the particular, the power of judgment is the only way 
―to say what is‖—legein ta eonta, an expression by Herodotus that Arendt 
frequently invokes
27—by finding the ―general,‖ which, as she remarks a 
bit enigmatically, ―must be seen as contained in the particular‖ and thus 
able to account discriminately for the particular.
28
 Or, in the seminar notes 
on Imagination, she says that reflective judgments ―‗derive‘ the rule from 
the particular.‖29 By contrast, when Kant submits ―that the power of 
judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained 
under the universal,‖ it is, first of all, to establish firmly that both 
determinant and reflective judgments are judgments in a rigorous sense 
(one of the effects of the formulaic declaration of what distinguishes them 
is, precisely, to emphasize their intrinsic judgmental form). Even though 
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Arendt frequently refers to Kant‘s statement that the power of judgment is 
the faculty to think the particular in relation to the universal, her emphasis 
on the particular, or, more precisely, on ―the world of particular 
appearances‖ encountered when the thinking ego no longer moves among 
generalities, is such that solely the reflective judgment is attributed a 
judgmental quality.
30
 Her assertion that ―judgment deals with particulars,‖ 
rather than with universals, aims at the same conclusion. As Arendt 
submits, the faculty of judgment ―is the faculty to judge particulars 
without subsuming them under those general rules which can be taught 
and learned until they grow into habits that can be replaced by other habits 
and rules.‖31 Indeed, according to Kant, determining reflection only 
subsumes, or, in conformity with the meaning of ―subsumption‖ in the 
eighteenth century, ―comprehends,‖ ―unites,‖ or ―combines‖ 
(zusammenfassen) the particular under a general term (Oberbegriff).
32
 But 
if it is unnecessary for the determinant judgment ―to think of a law for 
itself in order to be able to subordinate the particular in nature to the 
universal,‖ it is simply because ―the law is sketched out for it a priori,‖ 
and is thus a ―transcendental [law,] given by the understanding . . . .‖33 The 
concepts given to determinant judgments are thus the concepts constitutive 
of objectivity in general and not some empirical and historically based 
rules that at one time were appropriate to judge but have now become 
ossified. Kant writes that the judgment is determining when it yields to 
―the universal laws without which nature in general (as object of the 
senses) could not be conceived . . . .‖34 These laws are not replaceable. It 
follows from this that what Arendt calls ―concepts‖ are not at all Kant‘s 
pure forms of the understanding that relieve the determinant judgment 
from finding the laws for the particulars of nature. 
Furthermore, it also needs to be pointed out that the reflective judgment 
is not at all a judgment free of subsumption. In section thirty-five of the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment it is made clear that in a reflective 
judgment the imagination itself, as a subjective power of the mind, is 
subsumed under the mental power of advancing from intuitions to 
concepts, that is, of the understanding as a subjective faculty.
35
 Now, from 
Kant‘s statements that the determinant judgment ―has nothing to do but 
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[to] subsume under given laws,‖ or that it ―has nothing further to do than 
to provide the condition of subsumption under the a priori concept of the 
understanding that has been laid down for it,‖ Arendt implicitly draws the 
conclusions that a determinant judgment does not do very much, that it is 
not really involved in the activity of judging, and that, consequently, it is 
barely—if at all—a judgment.36 
However, Arendt also acknowledges that, even when judgment only 
―subsumes the particular under its appropriate general rule . . . this 
apparently simple operation has its difficulties, for since there are no rules 
for the subsumption, this must be decided freely,‖37 thus suggesting that 
the determining judgment is not so deficient as far as the activity of 
judging is concerned. Indeed, what about Kant‘s claim that the 
transcendental power of judgment also needs to provide the condition of 
subsumption, that is, ―the succession of the determinations of one and the 
same thing‖?38 Before I take up Arendt‘s own understanding of the 
reflective judgment however, I would like to raise the question of whether, 
indeed, the reflective judgment in Kant involves such greater operational 
activity than the determinant judgment. Undoubtedly, Kant‘s talk of the 
reflective judgment‘s need ―to find‖ the universal for the particular, or ―to 
ascend‖ to the universal when only particulars are given, suggests a more 
laborious procedure. Yet since such finding or ascending is in this case 
accomplished by way of reflection, everything depends on what, precisely, 
―mere reflection‖ consists of. 
Before I attempt to answer this question, let me first point out that after 
having characterized ―the capacity to judge [as] a specifically political 
ability in exactly the sense denoted by Kant,‖ Arendt contends in her essay 
The Crisis in Culture that this understanding of judging is ―virtually as old 
as articulated political experience. The Greeks,‖ she continues, ―called this 
ability [phronesis] . . . .‖39 Several remarks are warranted here. First, from 
all of Arendt‘s references to phronesis it is clear that Arendt has in mind 
Plato‘s, but also (and especially) Aristotle‘s later conception of this notion 
as calculating intelligence.
40
 However, that does not yet make her a Neo-
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Aristotelian as Albrecht Wellmer has argued. Though she understands 
phronesis as deliberation, for Arendt it is not a deliberation in view of 
calculating well-balanced means for prudent action.
41
 Second, however 
surprising it may seem to link reflective judgment to Prudence or to 
Practical Wisdom, this association may have its origin in Kant‘s 
Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, even though Kant speaks here of 
prudence as only a technical-practical rule—a rule that derives from a 
determining concept. He writes: ―[a]ll technically practical rules (i.e., 
those of art and skill in general, as well as those of prudence, as a skill in 
influencing human beings and their will), so far as their principles rest on 
concepts, must be counted only as corollaries of theoretical philosophy.‖42 
Third, if one does not lose sight of Arendt‘s claim that it is ―behind taste‖ 
that Kant discovered ―an entirely new human faculty, namely, judgment,‖ 
the reflection that Arendt links with phronesis is certainly not the ―mere 
reflection‖ that, for Kant, constitutes the reflective judgment of taste. In 
any event, for the moment, it must suffice to point out that by linking 
phronesis to reflection, reflection in the reflective judgment is understood 
by Arendt to correspond to the calculation (logizesthai) and, especially, 
the deliberation (boulesthai) by which Prudence is characterized and that, 
in the same way as the reflective judgment, always deals with particular 
things. In view of what I will establish hereafter about Kant‘s 
understanding of the nature of reflection in the reflective judgment, I note 
only that deliberation takes a long time according to Aristotle, 
distinguishing it from the skill in conjecturing, which he says operates 
rapidly. Deliberation, by contrast, ―takes a long time‖; it is slow. 
―Deliberative Excellence,‖ Aristotle adds, ―is not the same as Quickness of 
mind . . . .‖43 
Of what, then, does reflection in the reflective judgment consist, and 
what does it accomplish? According to section thirty-five of the third 
Critique, the judgment of taste, when faced with a particular for which it 
has no concept, bends or folds back upon itself inasmuch as it itself is the 
subjective condition of all judgments. As Kant remarks, ―[t]he subjective 
condition of all judgments is the faculty for judging itself, or the power of 
judgment.‖44 In reflecting upon itself, thus being ―itself, subjectively, both 
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object as well as law,‖45 the reflective judgment discovers within itself the 
law for its act, which is none other than—precisely—the ―subjective 
formal condition of a judgment in general.‖46 But what is this subjective 
law, which allows the judgment of taste to profess ―a universality and 
necessity‖ like determinant judgments do, but one that, in distinction from 
the latter, is merely subjective? With regard to a representation by means 
of which an object is given to us, the subjective formal condition for 
judgment itself, which grounds the judgment when no concept for this 
object is available, is ―the reciprocal relation of the understanding and the 
imagination,‖ that is, their subjective agreement or consonance 
(Zusammenstimmung).
47
 When bending back upon itself in the face of an 
object that it cannot subsume under a given concept, the faculty of 
judgment discovers within itself the very purposiveness of this reciprocal 
relation to which it submits itself as an a priori law in reflecting and 
judging the particular in question. This harmonious play of the faculties of 
representation, their purposiveness being beneficial for cognition in 
general, is the very concept that reflective judgment must find and under 
which it in turn subsumes the mere form of the representation of an object, 
thus performing a judgment in all its formal rigor. Because the concept to 
be found in a reflective judgment is that of the subjective condition of all 
judging, Kant can state that the judgment of taste is ―a judgment in 
general.‖48 The reflection that constitutes it consists in turning upon the 
faculty of judgment‘s subjective conditions and discovering purposiveness 
as the concept under which it then can reflect upon the object and subsume 
the representation of the object (rather than the object itself). If such a 
judgment asserts the beauty of an object, which is immediately followed 
by the feeling of pleasure, it is because representation and reason find 
themselves in agreement. In short, rather than a pondering, meditating, or 
deliberating operation that takes time, it follows from all of this that ―the 
operation of reflection‖49 takes place immediately when confronted with 
an object for which no determined concept is available but, that in light of 
its form in its representation, is judged beautiful. Even though at first the 
reflective judgment appears much more laborious than the determinant 
judgment, it is not. The subjective free play of the faculties of 
representation for cognition in general, that is, the concept that the 
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reflective judgment must ―find‖ (or to which it must ―ascend‖) in order to 
subsume the representation of its object, takes place in an instantaneous 
fashion. Compared to what, according to Arendt, is the case in political 
judgment concerning particulars, no complex search or lengthy 
deliberation and reflection are involved in the aesthetic reflective 
judgment. It happens in no time, time being understood here in an 
empirical sense. Of course, this does not mean that time as a 
transcendental form would not be implied in subsuming the particular 
under the found concept. Indeed, in the same way as in determinant 
judgment, the law of the subsumption of a particular under the concept to 
be found by a reflective judgment would also be that of the succession of 
the determinations of the particular.  
This all seems to suggest that Kant‘s elaborations on the operation of 
reflection in a judgment concerning particulars for which no determinate 
concept is available has little similarity with Arendt‘s understanding of 
judgment. In fact, as is obvious from her lectures on Kant—especially 
from her comments on section thirty-nine—Arendt completely ignores the 
fact that for Kant the reflective judgment of the beautiful is grounded on 
the free play of the powers of cognition. She proceeds immediately to the 
sensus communis as a sense that guarantees the power of judging.
50
 So, is 
Arendt simply wrong in looking at the reflective judgment as a model for 
political judgment, as a number of her critics have suggested? Indeed, 
what about Kant‘s implicit understanding that the discovery of the law for 
judging particulars for which no determined concept exists, in every single 
case in which one is confronted with such an object, must be accomplished 
again? Is it not this Kantian specificity of the reflective judgment that in 
fact undergirds Arendt‘s contention that the reflective judgment alone is a 
genuine judgment? Even though the reflective judgment is not more 
toilsome than the determinant judgment and occurs in no time, the 
reflection that constitutes it must be relaunched on every occasion when 
one finds oneself in the presence of a particular without available concepts 
in order to secure the agreement of the singular object‘s representation 
with the powers of representation. Furthermore, the concept or principle 
that must be found for a particular must be a rule that reflects this 
particular and not another—in short, a rule that is appropriate to this 
particular in all its singularity. In this context, it would be necessary to 
follow up on Kant‘s observation in sections nine and thirty-nine that the 
subjective consonance of the faculties of representation in a reflective 
 
 












judgment is a function of their proportionality. Needless to say, 
proportionality is another term for agreement or consonance. At the same 
time, the notion suggests variability in the way the consonance of the 
faculties is achieved. Thus, I would suggest that it is the possibility of the 
differing proportionality of the faculties that allows a reflective judgment 
concerning a particular to provide a law that allows for its subsumption as 
that particular as that and no other. A judgment of taste is also always, as 
Kant holds, a ―singular judgment.‖51  
Yet, if the task of Arendt‘s power of judgment does not consist in 
finding the general in the form of the subjective formal conditions of the 
judgment in general for the particular for which no pregiven concept is at 
hand, how, then, is one to conceive the reflection that the power of 
judgment requires? Although the answer to this question is very much a 
function of the kind of particulars that require such reflection, one can 
safely assume that she conceives of reflection as deliberation (by the 
many, rather than the lone subject) about things that in the public realm, in 
its Erscheinungsraum, are of immediate concern to it. The power of 
judgment as the political faculty par excellence is from the start shared by 
all, even though Arendt also stresses that in each case it has to be 
performed by a singular subject. As Arendt reminds us on several 
occasions, no one can be relieved of this burden—the burden of freedom. 
In this case, however, it is not so much the play of the faculties that 
provides the concept as the expanded mindset through which I can think in 
the place of others, which then allows me to come up with a general 
concept under which to subsume the particular. 
At this juncture, a thorough investigation of Arendt‘s conception of 
―appearance‖ would be warranted, for it not only constitutes the public 
space but also the very particulars for which no universal is available in 
advance, and that thus invite judgment. Such an investigation would have 
to distinguish the phenomena constitutive of the political sphere from both 
the Kantian and Husserlian conception of phenomena as well as explore 
how the ancient model of the agon—which, in Arendt‘s understanding, 
gives each protagonist ―the opportunity to show himself as he really is, 
that is, by appearing in reality to become fully real [wirklich in 
Erscheinung treten und damit völlig wirklich zu werden]‖—provides the 
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if in the present context, I defer such an investigation in order to take up 
Arendt‘s discussion at the very end of her Lectures on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy of the two ideas on which one must reflect in order to arrive at 
judgments, I do so on the basis of understanding the particulars judgment 
is concerned with as being made up by appearances within the sphere of 
publicity.  
The first of these ideas is ―purposiveness,‖ and the second, which 
Arendt qualifies as ―by far more valuable,‖ is ―exemplary validity.‖53 In 
support of her argument she quotes Kant‘s statement from the Critique of 
Pure Reason that ―examples are the go-cart of judgment.‖ What is 
important for our discussion is that Arendt distinguishes the exemplar 
from Platonic ideas or Kantian concepts and from mere abstractions, both 
of which concern the cognition of things, as pertaining to reflective 
judgment—in short, to judgments in a strict sense. As Arendt recalls, 
―‗example‘ comes from eximere, ‗to single out some particular.‘‖ And she 
adds: ―[t]his exemplar is and remains a particular that in its very 
particularity reveals the generality that otherwise could not be defined.‖54 
In other words, for Arendt, the exemplar is the general or universal that the 
reflecting judgment is to find in the absence of pregiven concepts for a 
particular. Furthermore, if exemplarity is an idea that must guide the 
reflection upon a general for a particular in the absence of concepts, it is 
also because such a general is already ―contained in the particular,‖ which 
itself is of the order of an appearance in the public space. And, finally, if 
such a general is contained in the particular it also follows that this general 
is, as something exemplar, paradoxically, still particular. If the Kantian 
idea of the exemplar is, for Arendt, a more fruitful solution to the problem 
that the reflective judgment must solve, it is precisely because the 
reflective judgment discovers—through reflection and deliberation—
something general that because still particular does not override the 
particularity of the object to be judged. Rather than doing violence to the 
particular, the exemplarity that is drawn from the particular as capable of 
it, empowers, if I may say so, the particular. Although for reasons of 
space, a detailed discussion of Arendt‘s interpretation of Kant‘s notion of 
a sensus communis must in turn be deferred, it should be clear that 
reflection in a reflective judgment that is guided by the idea of exemplarity 
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is, for Arendt, predicated on public deliberation of the appearances that 
make up the public and political Erscheinungsraum. 
Undoubtedly, if the power of judgment that Kant discovered when he 
came upon the judgment of taste is not identical to the reflective judgment 
of taste but indeed, as Arendt suggests, the more fundamental power of 
judgment that is constitutive of the political, one cannot expect the 
analogy between the judgment of taste and the political judgment to be 
seamless.
55
 From what I have shown about the concept that has to be 
found in an aesthetic reflective judgment so that the particular can be 
subsumed under it—namely, that this concept consists in the subjective 
purposiveness of the faculties of representation—it is clear that Arendt 
does not have in mind Kant‘s prime concern of securing judgment in the 
absence of concepts for particulars and, hence, the fundamental 
conformity between nature and reason. Although Arendt notes in passing 
at one point in her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy that 
―purposiveness is an idea by which to regulate one‘s reflections in one‘s 
reflective judgments,‖ Robert J. Dostal is also correct when he holds that 
―throughout her lectures Arendt studiously avoids the theme of 
purposiveness which is the single dominant and unifying theme of the 
Critique of Judgment.‖56 It also follows from this that the judgmental 
accomplishment of the power of judgment as an intrinsically political 
faculty must be very different from that of the pure aesthetic judgment. 
Here one would have to return again to Arendt‘s identification of the 
power of judgment with a certain phronesis and to her characterization of 
judgment as involved in distinguishing, discriminating, and deciding. Let 
me also add that, if one follows Maurizio Passerin d‘Entrèves‘ remark 
that, in order to connect the activity of thinking to that of judgment as 
Arendt attempts to do in The Life of the Mind, one must release judgment 
―from ossified categories of thought and conventional standards of 
behavior,‖ thus making it reflective rather than determinant, then one must 
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So far I have held that what Arendt understands by ―reflection‖ in a 
judgment about a particular for which the understanding cannot come up 
with a determined concept is akin to deliberation. I now turn very briefly 
to her comments on Kant‘s referral to ―the operation of reflection‖ in 
section forty of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, that is, in ―On 
Taste as a Kind of Sensus Communis.‖ According to Kant, sensus 
communis is ―the idea of a communal sense,‖ i.e., of ―a faculty for judging 
that in its reflection takes account (a priori) of everyone else‘s way of 
representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to 
human reason as a whole . . . .‖58 Kant defines the operation of reflection 
when he writes:  
Now this happens by one holding his judgment up not so much to 
the actual as to the merely possible judgment of others, and putting 
himself into the position of everyone else, merely by abstracting 
from the limitations that contingently attach to our own judging; 
which is in turn accomplished by leaving out as far as is possible 
everything in one‘s representational state that is matter, i.e., 
sensation, and attending solely to the formal peculiarities of his 
representation or his representational state.
59
  
For Arendt, reflection in a judgment, and especially in a judgment of 
taste, ―always reflects upon others and their taste, takes their possible 
judgments into account.‖60 It is here that for Arendt the imagination comes 
in, above all (if not primarily) as re-productive imagination. Basically 
defining it as the power to make present what is absent, such as, for 
instance, possible opinions of others on some matter, the imagination, 
first, ―transforms an object into something I do not have to be directly 
confronted with but that I have in some sense internalized,‖ in short, into a 
representation. Arendt concludes that ―[t]his operation of the imagination 
prepares the object for ‗the operation of reflection.‘ And this second 
operation—the operation of reflection—is the actual activity of judging 
something.‖61 The actual opinions of others on a given subject matter are 
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thus less relevant than the representations of these opinions in one‘s inner 
sense (these being stripped of all matter, according to Kant, so as to be 
able to attend solely to the formal peculiarities of these representations, 
including one‘s own).62 This leads one to deliberate about them in a 
judgmental fashion according to ―the standards of the operation of 
reflection‖ that, according to Arendt, are pleasure and displeasure.63 As a 
function of the imagination, then, reflection is intrinsic to judgment in that, 
even though it is a subjective act, judgment is not private but communal 
from the start. At its core, the reflection upon the viewpoints of others is a 
form of deliberation within me, not between me and myself but between 
me and others regarding communal matters and aiming at deliberate 
choice (prohairesis). 
If Arendt can hold that the determinant judgment is not really a 
judgment at all, is it not because—at least in the case of the aesthetic 
judgment—the reflective judgment is, as Kant has shown, not only 
judgment in general but also an autonomous form of judging with an a 
priori principle of its own? Arendt does not explore the transcendental 
nature of Kant‘s investigation into what constitutes a pure judgment of 
taste, yet Kant‘s demonstration that the aesthetic power of judgment is a 
particular faculty with an a priori principle of its own, which distinguishes 
it from determinant or logical judgment, is important for Arendt‘s claim 
that judging is a distinct faculty of the mind. Arendt looks in Kant to 
establish the faculty of judgment in all its independence from knowledge 
and truth, something Albrecht Wellmer has branded as a ―mythology of 
Judgment.‖ For Wellmer, to put determinant judgment into question rests 
on a narrow conception of rationality informed by the traditional way of 
understanding argumentation in the sciences.
64
 
As a political faculty from the start, Arendt develops judgment in 
analogy to what Kant establishes about the pure judgment of taste. Indeed, 
in analogy to Kant‘s separation of the judgment of taste not only from 
judgments by the senses but also, above all, from judgments of cognition 
(and morality) and to Kant‘s claim that the aesthetic reflective judgment 
enjoys a law particular to itself, Arendt, in turn, argues that the power of 
judgment, as ―the most political of man‘s mental abilities,‖ is a distinct 
faculty with a ―logic‖ of its own. Needless to say, this does not mean, as a 
number of critics hold, that she aestheticizes the political. The notion of 
analogy consists precisely in establishing structural resemblances between 
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two entities or domains whose irreducible differences remain intact. 
Before Arendt even links judgment with the specific type of phenomena 
that constitute the sphere of publicness and ground it in the sensus 
communis, Kant‘s transcendental inquiry into the judgment of taste serves 
Arendt in securing the claim of the autonomy of judging as a faculty that, 
distinct from what the judgment of taste establishes when it calls a 
particular object beautiful (rather than ugly or, at its worst, nauseating)—
namely, its formal conformity (or non-conformity) to the powers of 
representation—is all about distinction, discrimination, and decision. 
To conclude, let us keep in mind that for Arendt the political is the 
realm of action (as opposed to labor and work) not only between men in 
the plural but also between free men. If Kant‘s reflective judgment has 
been so important for Arendt in the context of her political reflections, it is 
because of this activity‘s—or faculty‘s—autonomy. The domain of the 
interactions of men in the public space is a domain that, in principle, is not 
ruled by a utilitarian logic of end and means. The latter belongs to the 
realm of work. Action, and in particular, judgment, as the most political of 
all acts, is not only an activity of free men, but is itself free and its own 
end. One is reminded here of what Aristotle in Book VI of Nicomachean 
Ethics says about political action, to which Arendt subscribes entirely. 
Arguing that ―doing [praxis] and making [poeisis] are generically 
different, since making aims at an end distinct from the act of making,‖ 
Aristotle submits that ―in doing [or what Arendt calls action, prattein] the 
end cannot be other than the act itself: doing well is indeed the end.‖65 
Judging as an action, which for Arendt implies the in-between dimension 
of the commerce of human beings qua free beings, is a doing that qua 
doing well is its own end. It is a doing whose meaning is immanent to it 
and does not lie in an end separate from or outside it.
66
 It is autonomous 
and free. The detour through Kant‘s Critique of the Power of Judgment 
aims first at philosophically buttressing this insight before using other 
elements from it—such as the sensus communis, the enlarged mentality, 
the relation between actor and spectator, and exemplary validity—to flesh 
out this autonomous activity‘s further characteristics.  
I return briefly to Arendt‘s characterization in Introduction into Politics 
of the reflective judgment as ―a judgment without standards 
[massstabloses Urteilen],‖ distinct, therefore, from determinate judgment 
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that applies concepts or standards known in advance to the particular to be 
subsumed under them. In this Introduction, she writes that:  
[b]ecause by its very nature action always creates relationships and 
ties as it moves into the world, there is inherent in it excessiveness 
or boundlessness [Massslosigkeit] . . . . To the Greek mind, this 
excess did not lie in the immoderateness of the man who acts, or in 
his hubris, but in the fact that the relationships arising through 
action are and must be of the sort that keep extending without 
limits. By linking men of action together, each relationship 
established by action ends up in a web of ties and relationships in 
which it triggers new links, changes the constellation of existing 
relationships, and thus always reaches out ever further, setting much 
more into interconnected motion than the man who initiates action 
ever could have foreseen.
67
 
Action, Arendt says in other contexts, triggers linear processes whose 
end cannot be contained in advance by any concept of an end or goal. But 
this boundlessness and excessiveness ―inherent in those free human 
actions that establish relationships‖ in unforeseeable, unpredictable, 
unprogrammable ways are at the same time a danger in that they can 
unleash ―devastating processes‖ that create ―a wasteland between men 
. . . .‖68 In order to ―seal off action from the danger of excessiveness 
always inherent in it,‖69 without making it subservient to utilitarian ends 
and means and thus destroying action‘s political nature, the free 
judgmental activity of a judgment without standards is called for. Without 
applying in advance known concepts or standards to particular actions, 
judgment discriminates each time in a singular way between those actions 
that cement the public space and those that put it in jeopardy. Such 
judgment without standards is the only way of warding off the danger that 
besets all free action without destroying the latter‘s intrinsically free 
nature. 
A final remark, finally! As Arendt has pointed out on several 
occasions, the Greek polis continues to be the inevitable reference point 
for rethinking politics and the political against a philosophical tradition 
that proceeds from the presupposition that the political is only at best of 
secondary importance. For a short period a public space opened up in 
which the free citizens‘ actions and speeches not only concerned the well-
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being of the polis but also primarily secured that very public space itself. 
However limited and short-lived the polis was, and in spite of the 
historico-social conditions under which political activity became possible 
for the limited number of Athenian citizens, what became possible at that 
time—the exercise of an autonomous faculty of judgment that maintained 
itself through actions and deeds that were its own ends—remains for 
Arendt the starting point for reflecting on politics. Yet, in no way does 
Arendt ever dream of a return to the Greek polis. Rather, the institution of 
a public space that is its own end, that is, the institution of deliberation and 
judgment as performed in the marketplace, continues to live on as an idea 
in light of which any elaboration on politics today, especially in extreme 
conditions, must be conducted. Arendt‘s insistence on judgment as a 
faculty that is autonomous is a regulative idea of sorts, not in the sense that 
this independence could ever be approximated, however tangentially, but 
in the sense that for her it is necessary to demand this unconditional 
autonomy in times when judgment has been corrupted and deprived of its 
spontaneity.  
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